Outside of the United States, few studies have estimated the effects of World War II service. In Australia, general war-time conscription and minimal involvement in the Korean War led to large cohort differences in military service rates, which we use for identification. We find a small, temporary negative effect on employment and a substantial positive effect on post-school qualifications, but not at the university level. While service increased home ownership slightly, it greatly reduced outright home ownership, consistent with the incentives provided by veterans' housing benefits. We also find a positive effect on marriage, but only from 1971. 
World War II (WWII) had a devastating effect globally, with at least 60 million individuals, mostly civilians, losing their lives. The events of WWII surpassed World War I in their 'utter ruthlessness', due to advances in military technology, especially the aerial bombardment of major cities (Marwick 1974, p2) . The focus of WWII research, in most countries, has therefore been to study the effects of war on broad populations rather than on servicemen (Akbulut-Yuksel 2014; Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 2004; Kesternich et al., 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2011; Harrison 1998) .
There is, nevertheless, a substantial literature on WWII service effects in the United States, where civilians were not directly affected since North America was beyond the main battle zones for most of the war. Another driver of this body of literature is the prominence of the GI Bill, which was established as they key repatriation mechanism after WW2 and remains in place today. The GI Bill is seen as a major driver of educational and social change in 20 th century America (Goldin and Katz, 2009 ).
Some of this research has addressed potential selection bias through the use of quasiexperimental techniques. Angrist and Krueger (1994) found that the relatively high earnings of WWII veterans are explained by selection rather than a causal impact of service. One of the strongest findings is that service increased college education considerably, most likely through the GI Bill (Bound and Turner, 2002) .
1 Larsen et al. (2015) found that this increased college participation also led veterans to marry more educated wives. They also found no effect on marital status at 1970. Fetter (2013) found eligibility for veterans' housing benefits (especially through a mortgage guarantee) shifted home purchase earlier in the life course for many men. Bedard and Deschêines (2006) found that military service increased the rate of post-service mortality, especially from smoking-related causes.
WWII was also particularly significant for Australia. It was the first time that Australia had faced the threat of invasion, requiring a full mobilisation of the economy (Beaumont 1996) .
As part of this, conscription on wartime service was introduced for the first time and almost a million Australians entered armed service, with hundreds of thousands more in auxiliary and war industries (Lloyd and Rees 1994) . This represented more than 2 in 5 of the adult male population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1938, pp. 351, 376 ).
There are a number of similarities and differences between the two countries which provide context for comparisons of results. Like the U.S. the war was largely fought beyond Australia's shores. Death rates were comparable, as was average length of service. 3 Both countries provided generous benefits to veterans, including for education, housing and employment protection, as well as disability compensation. And in both countries these benefits have been proposed as a key driver of post-war human capital investment (Goldin and Katz, 2009; Anderson and Eaton, 1982) . A key difference however is that university enrolment rates were much lower in Australia prior to WWII and indeed subsequently.
We know of no previous econometric work on the effects of WWII service for Australians and we address this void. 4 Our approach is to exploit large cohort differences in military service rates. Over 90% of Australian men born in the early 1920s served in WWII. This percentage was close to zero for those born in the late 1920s. A key advantage of our study over U.S. work is that the number of Australians who served in the following decades was much smaller. In particular, veterans of the Korean War made up less than 3% of each onewar, often using data from surveys and interviews. It has addressed life course aspects such as whether older or younger servicemen were affected differently and the impact on different social and racial groups. 3 3.8% of Australian service personnel died in WWII (authors' calculations from World War Two Nominal Roll 2002) and 2.5% for the U.S. (Chambers, 1999: 849) . Average length of service was 41 months for Australia (authors' calculations from World War Two Nominal
Roll 2002) and 33 months for the U.S. (Goralski, 1981: 422) .
4 Previous research has consisted largely of oral and archival historical work. Garton (1996) and Damousi (2001) look at the effects of military service on the servicemen and their families, respectively. Garton (1996) suggests that military service had a negative impact on employment prospects, especially for those individuals who were captured prisoners of war.
year birth cohort. 5 This avoids the problem faced by American research that cohorts just too young for WWII served in Korea in large numbers.
Whilst data availability is a challenge for such a study, we draw on several sources. We consider effects on major life outcomes, specifically employment, education, housing and marital status. 6 We find a small negative effect on employment, but only in 1966 and not afterwards. We find little evidence that service (including through subsequent education benefits) increased university education, though it did increase the attainment rates of other post-school qualifications. This contrasts with the large effect found for the U.S. overall (Bound and Turner, 2002; Stanley, 2003) , but is perhaps unsurprising given that university education was rare and perhaps not a realistic option for many Australians of this era. In some respects this is analogous to the opportunities available to blacks in the South of the U.S., for whom WWII service also did not enhance college education (Turner and Bound, 2003) .
We find a small positive effect on home ownership, likely due to veterans' housing benefits, and a much larger positive effect on having a mortgage, which is consistent with the Unmarried men aged 21 were drafted for three months of training and then required to serve for three months (Dennis et al. 2008) . The conscription coverage gradually broadened over the first two years of the war, eventually being fixed at 18-45 for single men and 18-35 for married men (Ville and Siminski 2011) . Initially, conscripts were only required to serve in Australia, along with New Guinea and adjacent islands. In 1942, as the war in south-east Asia came closer to Australian shores, conscripts could be expected to serve in territories in the 'South West Pacific Zone' which included Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japanese-held islands south of the equator. The Australian Army formed the majority of the defence force, with 728,000 enlisted (Robertson 1981, p64 ), compared with the Royal Australian Air Force, with over 200,000 recruits and the Royal Australian Navy with 37,000 recruits (Beaumont 2001, pp. 147, 181) .
Over half a million (550,000) Australians went on active service overseas, about 1 in 12 of the population (Beaumont 1996, p. xx) . Their experience of service was highly variable. Only a fraction of recruits were in front line activities that were likely to expose them directly to battle. Some Australians served in units alongside fellow countrymen, whereas others, especially in the RAAF, were part of a broader British Commonwealth force. While many Australians served in New Guinea and nearby Pacific islands, others found themselves in a variety of locations in Europe and the Middle East, which exposed them to quite different forms of engagement. The early campaigns in the Middle East were conducted on flat terrain, with aircraft and artillery bombardments regularly experienced (Gullett, 1984 (Beaumont, 1996, pp. xx, xxv; Long, 1963, p. 634) . Probably another 13,000 died in training or in non-combat situations while on service. 7 We do not have data on how many were disabled. Compared with Britain and the US, Australia had a high turnover of soldiers.
Repatriation
Wartime service impacted upon an individual's workforce opportunities and capabilities. By being removed from the civilian workforce, servicemen missed out on a period of work experience or education and training, which could impact on their lifetime earnings and employability. In addition, the physical or psychological damage caused by service could further damage employability. Offsetting these disadvantages, to some degree, were the training, discipline, camaraderie and teamwork skills that formed part of the military experience (Johnston, 1996; Elder and Clipp 1988; Costa and Kahn, 2003, p. 520) .
Repatriation policy in Australia, as elsewhere, recognised that the net effect of wartime service on future employment was probably negative. Compensation policies took several forms. The main compensatory payments of interest, dating back to WWI, were the disability payment (historically called the war pension) along with service pensions paid to veterans on the grounds of age, permanent incapacity to work or total blindness (DVA 2003) . Disability payments were based on the level of incapacity. Most countries, including Britain, used deciles working down from 100%. For Australia, any incapacity deemed below 10 percent was considered slight enough to warrant no compensation. Britain was slightly more stringent, with anything below 20 percent receiving no compensation (Garton 1996, p. 99) .
Since the Repatriation Act 1920, there is also a special rate of disability pension for those who are totally and permanently incapacitated (TPI), which pays above the normal pension (DVA 2003) .
Pension eligibility fell into two categories: those with or without operational service.
Operational service included any service outside Australia, and domestic service which incurred danger from hostile forces (DVA 2003) . Operational service had no effect on the range or level of compensation, but determined the standard of proof that would be applied. Training Scheme (CRTS), which was available for all who had served at least six months and were honourably discharged. This was intended to equip and prepare returned servicemen and women with the skills and qualifications to help them re-enter the labor market at the end of the conflict (Garton 1996, pp. 81, 98-9) . The CRTS provided them with the opportunity to undertake university education or enter technical education/apprenticeships by paying a living allowance and the cost of fees, tools of trade, and books (Lloyd and Rees 1994).
In addition to the CRTS and liberal pension offerings, servicemen returned to a period of post war reconstruction, increased economic activity, and high levels of growth in employment and incomes (Garton 1996) . Some servicemen may have been incentivized to take the disability pension rather than to work, given the liberal standard of proof. Conversely, the period of increased economic activity and job opportunities may have made servicemen less likely to take the pension.
Further assistance into the workforce was embodied in the employment preference policy.
Dating back to WWI, the policy sought to ensure that no ex-servicemen were disadvantaged by employers in seeking to return to the workforce. Anecdotal evidence from disgruntled former servicemen suggests this policy was difficult to monitor and enforce. Even in the public service, where government could exercise a more direct influence, returning servicemen often had to work their way up the ladder in competition with younger employees (Garton, 1996, pp. 89-91) .
Housing Benefits
A severe shortage of housing among discharged servicemen after both world wars motivated a housing benefits policy. Employment disadvantages and absence while on service might impact a veteran's ability to become a home owner. Beginning in 1918, under the Defense Service Homes (DSH) scheme, veterans who had been on active overseas service were able to access loans to purchase or build their home on terms preferential to the market including low interest rates, no deposit, extended payment terms, and rent-to-purchase provisions.
Initially, the government had in mind building houses in blocks to sell to veterans. Within a few years this had failed due to the inexperience of the War Services Homes Commissioner and the urgency of housing demand. In its place, applicants could be funded to build their own home or to buy a new or existing one including refinancing mortgages. This was normally restricted to one loan for one house except when a veteran was compelled to move 
Methods
Our empirical approach exploits between-cohort variation in military participation rates. We wish to estimate the effects of military service and subsequent benefit eligibility (S) on various outcome variables (Y) for person i in birth cohort j in the following equation: We avoid such omitted variable bias by using an instrumental variable strategy. The instrument we use is the overall military participation rate within each one-year birth cohort (ܵ ̅ ), which is plausibly exogenous. The first stage equation is therefore:
where ݃(*) is the same order polynomial as ݂(*). As discussed by Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) the predicted value from this equation (ܵ መ ) is identical to ܵ ̅ , because none of the regressors in the equation vary within cohorts. As we discuss in the following section, we obtain population level data for ܵ ̅ . Therefore, the first stage regression estimates are not subject to sampling error, again following Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) .
The second stage equation is therefore:
This equation can be estimated by OLS. However, ܵ ̅ varies only between cohorts, and so it is appropriate to account for potential inter-cohort correlation of the error term. Since the number of birth cohorts is reasonably small in our case, cluster-robust standard errors may not be reliable (Angrist and Pischke 2008: p313) . Since all regressors vary only between cohorts, we instead adopt a group-means approach (Angrist and Pischke 2008: p313) . In this approach, the data are collapsed to the cohort level:
Equation (4) is estimated by GLS with weights proportional to the number of individuals in each cohort so that the point-estimates are identical to OLS estimates of (3) and the standard errors appropriately account for clustering within each cohort. To account for the possibility of heteroscedasticity whilst considering the small samples we use, we show HC3 standard errors (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) . In almost all of our models, these standard errors are larger than the corresponding HC2, ordinary robust, or OLS standard errors. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
To implement the empirical strategy outlined above, we only require cohort-level data on military participation rates and the outcome variables. Given the historical nature of this study, even such data are not trivial to obtain, and certain assumptions were required.
The study population is the set of males who lived in Australia at the time of WWII. A cohort is defined by financial year of birth (that is, from July to June). We use financial years of birth (rather than calendar years, or indeed month of birth) to match what is available in the second-stage data.
The first-and second-stage data are described in turn below.
First-Stage Data
For the first-stage, we require military participation rates for males by financial year of birth. These counts are subject to measurement error for three reasons. First, the Nominal Roll does not record gender. In personal correspondence, DVA advised that the Nominal Roll includes an estimated 60,000 women overall (or 5.88 percent of the total). Without further information on the age distribution of those women, we assume that this proportion is constant across cohorts, and we deflate the counts accordingly. Second, there are multiple records in the Nominal Roll for some individuals who had a break in service. We have been advised by the data custodians that the extent of such duplication has never been estimated, on the basis that many such duplicates likely contain minor changes in personal details, due either to recording inaccuracy or to enlistees' strategic reasons. Finally, 108,320 records (approximately 10%) are missing DOB. We have not made adjustments to address duplication or for missing DOB.
It is difficult to gauge whether the upward bias due to duplicate records is of similar magnitude to the offsetting (10%) downward bias due to missing DOB. But the duplication of records would need to exceed 20% of the overall count for that count to be biased by more than 10%. A further limitation of the Nominal Roll is that it does not flag those who were deployed and so we cannot attempt to separately identify the effects of deployed and nondeployed service. Census counts in the denominators. For the main analysis, we set the military service proportion for each birth year to the average of the two proportions calculated using population counts from the 1933 and 1947 Censuses, respectively.
11 Given that the 1933 Census was taken six years before the outbreak of the War, we considered adjustments for population change using historical population estimates, which are available in 5-year age brackets at June 30 of each year (ANS, 2014) . But the size of each relevant 5-year birth cohort barely changed between 1933 and 1938 (usually by less than 1%), and so adjustments were deemed unnecessary. 12 The proportions estimated using 1933 denominators are assumed to be zero for cohorts born after the 1933 Census date. These males were aged 12 years or less when WWII ended.
Figure 1 also shows much variation in participation between birth cohorts, with a major drop from 86 percent for the 1924 cohort to just 2 percent in the 1928 cohort. This is due to the conflict coming to an end, and the subsequent reduced need for Australian manpower.
In our main analysis, the first-stage data consist of 17 observations, one for each year of birth between 1917-18 and 1933-1934 . These birth cohorts include approximately 1.02 million Australian men at the end of WWII. 13 This data window was chosen to be centred around 1925-26, which is the midpoint of the dramatic decline in service participation rates. We conduct extensive sensitivity tests to the bandwidth of this data window.
The upper panel of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics from the first stage database for the main estimation sample. Across the 17 birth cohorts, 46.7% of men served in the WWII era.
Amongst those who did serve, 3.6% died in service, 2.1% were captured as Prisoners of War, and the average length of service was 3.25 years.
Second-Stage Data
The data used in the second stage regressions are from the five Australian Censuses of Population and Housing held between 1966 and 1986. Using the Australian Bureau of Statistics' customised data service, we obtained a set of tables derived from the full database from each Census, for which 100% of the Australian population was in scope. This service is not available for earlier Censuses. Specifically, these were two-way frequency tabulations for a range of outcome variables including labor market status, marital status, housing outcomes, and educational attainment each by single year of age, from each Census.
We used the customised service because these data are not available in published form, nor as microdata. Published two-way frequency tabulations from Census data are generally presented in five-or ten-year age bands, which is not sufficient for our analysis. Microdata sample files are available to researchers to access directly for Censuses held from 1981
onwards, but we preferred to instead draw on the custom tabulations from the full population. The proportion never married also declined from 11.9% in 1966 to 8.5% in 1986. During this same period, the proportion permanently separated or divorced more than doubled from 3.9% to 8.4%, and the proportion who were widowers increased by a similar share from 0.8% to 4.2%.
Our empirical approach relies on the assumption that smooth functions of age adequately control for all non-service factors that vary between cohorts. We scrutinise this assumption for key outcome variables in There are similar discontinuities in other Census years. We therefore exclude cohorts older than 60 from any version of the analysis of labor market outcomes. The rationale is that any smooth function of age is not an adequate control for non-service differences between cohorts.
The upper middle panel of Figure The lower left panel of Figure 2 shows the scatterplot for home ownership. Here, there is little variation between cohorts up to the 1925 birth cohort, before dropping steadily for younger birth cohorts. The lower middle panel shows the unconditional proportion of men that own their home, but have a mortgage. There is much variation in this series across cohorts, varying from around 16% for the oldest cohort to 50% for the youngest cohort, reflecting life-course differences in mortgage repayment. This variation appears very smooth, but not monotonic. In particular, the series briefly turns downward at the same cohorts where military service rates also fall (Figure 1) . A similar pattern is evident in the corresponding plots for the other Census years where this variable is available.
The lower right panel of Figure 2 shows a corresponding scatterplot, for the proportion of men who were married, which is high for every birth cohort. It is characterised by an upward trend. The proportions for the early-1920s birth cohorts appear somewhat higher than the overall trend.
Results and Discussion
Since the values of the parameters in the first stage equation are known without sampling error, there is no first stage regression output, following Imbens and Van Der Klauw (1995), as discussed above. [1918] [1919] [1920] [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] , controlling for a quadratic trend in age. The appendices show extensive sensitivity tests to both the order of the age polynomial and the bandwidth. Unless otherwise specified, the results are not sensitive to these variations in specification. 15 In each Census year, there is a clear discontinuity in employment at age 60 (and a larger discontinuity at age 65). For this reason, we do not estimate any models of labor market outcomes using estimation samples that include men aged 60 or over, as polynomials in age do not adequately control for secular differences between cohorts. This prevents the use of the 1981 and 1986 Censuses for studying labor market outcomes. This small and temporary effect suggests that most veterans were effectively reintegrated into the civilian labor market, perhaps assisted by government policy to prioritise veterans in public sector recruitment. Moreover, the negative experiences of wartime service should also be set against the positive aspects of training and camaraderie discussed earlier. The results lend only very limited and temporary support to the view that Australian servicemen fared worse in the labor market (Garton, 1996) . That said, employment is a crude measure of labor market outcomes. It would be informative to also study effects on earnings, but such data were not collected in the Census.
Labor Market Outcomes

Educational Outcomes
Results for educational outcomes are shown in Table 3 , which has the same structure as Table   2 , apart from including results for all five census years from 1966 to 1986. Panel A shows that military service had a significant, but relatively modest, effect on post-school qualifications, increasing the rate of attainment by about 3 percentage points at 1971. This effect is equal to about 10% of the mean. The CRTS is presumably the mechanism for this effect.
However, Panel B shows that military service did not have a large effect, if any, on the rate of university qualifications, regardless of which Census year is analysed. This is in stark contrast to the experience of US veterans, for whom the GI Bill greatly increased college education (Bound and Turner, 2002) . This is perhaps unsurprising given that 90 per cent of CRTS recipients had chosen vocational and technical, rather than university, education (Mackinnon & Proctor, 2013, p. 439) . Further corroborating evidence for this result is provided by the low prevalence of university qualifications for the 1919-1924 birth cohorts (of whom 90% had WWII service).
Of these men, only 2.9% had obtained a university qualification by 1976. In comparison, 13.0% of U.S. men from the same birth cohorts were college graduates by 1970. 16 This result conflicts with the conclusions reached by Australian scholars who relate the postwar expansion of university enrolments to the CRTS (Anderson and Eaton, 1982, p. 10; Groenewegen, 2009, pp. 57-9) . From a very low base, university enrolments expanded considerably after WWII (Booth and Kee, 2011, pp. 259-61) . But there are other potential explanations for this: pent up demand, regular increases in government funding to the sector including scholarships, and changing popular attitudes and expectations towards tertiary education in the post-war era are all contenders. Our results motivate further research into the reasons for post-war university expansion in Australia.
Housing Outcomes
Results for housing outcomes are shown in Table 4 , which follows the structure of the previous two tables. It suggests that the effects on housing were substantial. Panel A shows estimated effects on the probability of being a home owner. It shows evidence that military service increased the probability of home ownership in 1966 substantially (1.8 percentage points). For all later years, the point estimates are around one percentage point in each year, although they are not always statistically significant and somewhat sensitive to alternate specifications ( (Hill, 1974, pp. 334-50; Australian Housing Corporation, 1976, p. 35) . The combination of longer terms and higher loan percentage made it easier for veterans to enter the housing market.
From 1976 onwards, the Census separately identifies home owners with and without mortgages. Panels B and C show results from models that use these as outcome variables.
They show that military service had a large negative effect (around 6 or 7 percentage points in each year where we have data) on the probability of being an outright home owner without a mortgage, mirrored by a large positive effect on having a mortgage (around 7 or 8 percentage points). This suggests that the DSH greatly reduced the probability of paying off mortgages. The most likely reason for this is that DSH loans became cheap credit when commercial rates, already above DSH rates since WWII, rose and diverged sharply from the DSH rates from the early 1970s (Figure 3 ). The role of the DSH in influencing Australian home ownership patterns warrants further investigation.
Panel D shows results for the probability of living in a rented dwelling. It shows small negative effects of service, which are statistically significant in 1966 and 1986. These effects are consistent with the positive effects on home-ownership in Column 1.
18
Panel E of Table 4 shows results for number of (bed)rooms in the residence. 19 The number of rooms is a proxy for housing quality. The results suggest that service did not have a large effect on housing quality. If it did have an effect, it seems to have been negative. The point estimates are negative in each year since 1971. However, only for 1981 is it statistically significant at the five per cent level. The estimate is also largest in 1981, suggesting a reduction in the number of bedrooms by 0.036. 18 The discrepancies between the offsetting effects on home ownership and renting are due to some residual housing tenure categories in each Census, for which we do not show results. Table 5 shows 2SLS estimated effects on marital outcomes. The results suggest that effects on marital outcomes are small, but also that they changed over time. The results in Column
Marital Outcomes
(1) show little evidence that military service affected marital outcomes at 1966. However, the effect on the probability of being married is positive and highly significant in each of the other Census years (Panel A). Whilst the estimate is rather small in each year, it increases over time, reaching 1.6 percentage points in 1986.
Panels B and C show no significant effects on the probability of being 'divorced or permanently separated', or of being a widower at any of these time points. Panel D shows that the positive effects on being married are largely mirrored by corresponding negative effects on the probability of having never married.
These results suggest that military service induced some men, who otherwise may never have married, to marry for the first time when aged in their 50s. Some caution should be taken with this interpretation, however, given that the point estimates for 'never married' in Panel D do not change markedly over the 1966-1986 period. Indeed the corresponding point estimates for 'divorced or permanently separated' in Panel B change slightly more over this period. This suggests that remarriage could also partly explain the positive marriage effect.
Regardless, one potential mechanism for the increasing positive effect on being married is veterans' higher pension wealth, which may be advantageous in the marriage market. This is due to earlier eligibility for a retirement pension for the veteran (at age 60, compared to 65 for non-veterans) and for his wife (55 compared to 60), as well as disability compensation payments for many veterans.
In any case, the results do not support the suggestion that WWII service led to family disruption and dissolution, at least later in life (Damousi, 2001) . Similar results were found by other quasi-experimental studies for Australian veterans of the Vietnam War (Siminski and Ville, 2012) , and for US veterans of WWII (Larsen et al., 2015) and Vietnam (Conley and Heerwig, 2013) .
Conclusion
Our paper is the first econometric study of Australian WWII service, with existing literature largely confined to the qualitative assessments of historians. Unlike most other major combatants, Australia and the U.S. were outside the main theatres of war and therefore service impact has been one of particular interest. Subsequent wars fought on foreign soil by both nations -Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan -indicate the ongoing policy significance of the effects of service and the suitability of subsequent repatriation policies such as the GI Bill.
Although the USA entered the war two years later than Australia, the conditions and length of individual service were similar between the two nations, as were the repatriation policies.
However, the minimal Australian service in the Korean War enhances the validity of our between-cohort IV approach.
Therefore, using data from five subsequent censuses, 1966-86, we studied the effects of service on a range of socio-economic outcomes, drawing comparisons with American results and the existing Australia historical literature. Our conclusions challenge some of the conventional narratives of Australian historians, succinctly, that war disrupted family life, caused veterans to struggle for work, and who were attracted into higher education by repatriation benefits. In our results, Australian servicemen were minimally disadvantaged in the labour market, were more likely to own a home, somewhat more likely to be married, and more likely to obtain a post-school qualification.
There are some similarities with US results, particularly for housing and marriage, but an important difference is that unlike the US experience, Australia's veterans' education benefits do not seem to have increased the rate of university qualifications. University education was rare at this time in Australia, and perhaps not seen by most veterans as a realistic option.
Also, in contrast to the GI Bill, the CRTS was terminated from 1950 and the subsequent expansion of public funding for higher education was not tied to military service.
Perhaps our most intriguing findings are for housing outcomes. Generous housing benefits, which in contrast to the CRTS, continue to be offered to the present, seem to have increased home ownership somewhat. However, they had a much larger negative effect on the probability of outright home-ownership (without a mortgage), at least from the 1970s possibly because of the reduced incentive to repay the low-interest loans. See Table 2 notes. 1949 -1950 -1997 , Occasional Paper No. 8, No 3.21b, RBA, Sydney. 1959 -1990 
Defence Service Homes Scheme
Although an interest rate of 5% per annum was specified in the first War Service Homes Act 1918, the actual rate charged was 3.75% from 1946 until the Defence Service Homes Act 1974, when a stepped rate was adopted: 3.75% up to $12,000, thereafter 7.25%. From March 1980 to Nov 1988 balances over $15,000, were charged 10%. In our Figure, 
